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LEGAL INTERSECTIONS 
Adoption Consents: 
Legal Incentives for Best Practices 
Elizabeth J. Samuels, JD 
The Uniform Adoption Act sets out commonly accepted goals of 
state adoption laws. Among them are the goals of protecting "minor 
children against unnecessary separation from their birth parents" and of 
ensuring "that a decision by a birth parent to relinquish a minor child 
and consent to the child's adoption is informed and voluntary ."l Yet, as 
a Texas judge writing in a contested adoption case observed, his state's 
not atypical law provided more safeguards for sophisticated purchasers 
of consumer products than it did for young mothers relinquishing their 
newborn infants: "Even as the senior justice on this court ... , I am 
allowed three days to cancel a contract to purchase consumer goods 
signed at my home-a document that is far less important than and a set-
ting that is far more comfortable than a hospital."2 
State adoption laws governing domestic infant adoption should, at a 
minimum, encourage and provide incentives for all adoption service 
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providers to engage in what are considered "best practices" for these 
children, their parents, and their prospective adoptive parents. That 
many state laws fail to do so is suggested by what one court has refen-ed 
to as "the multitude of cases in which a natural parent seeks to regain her 
child."3 In the reports of cases involving mothers' attempts to revoke 
their consents to the adoption of their newborn infants, attempts which 
are almost always unsuccessful, one can usually discern a lack of the 
skilled and unbiased counseling that would have provided these moth-
ers with sufficient information and support to make deliberate and final 
decisions.4 Even more starkly, the cases highlight the very short periods 
of time foHowing the child's birth after which these mothers' consent 
may be given and may become irrevocable. Their consents, typically, 
were signed within hours or within a day or two of the birth, and were 
just as quickly regretted. 
In one recent case, for example, the mother throughout her pregnancy 
considered but did not decide upon placing her child for adoption. The 
day after the birth, she was still undecided. The following day, when she 
was to be released from the hospital and when the agency with which 
she had consulted was going to close for the weekend, she authorized 
the agency counselor to come to the hospital. The counselor discussed 
the mother's situation with her and presented her with the paperwork, 
and that evening the adoptive parents left the hospital with the child. In 
court, the counselor testified that the mother understood her relinquish-
ment was in-evocable. The mother testified that she had been weak and 
tired from not having slept for 24 hours, that she had been affected by 
Percocet, the narcotic she was taking for pain, and that she did not recall 
whether she was told the consent was irrevocable. At home the next 
day, she decided she had made a mistake and, according to her testi-
mony, called but was unable to reach the agency. That evening she 
called the prospective adoptive parents to say she had made a mistake 
and did not want to place the child for adoption. Approximately 10 days 
later, a representative of the agency signed the relinquishment docu-
ment, giving the agency the power to consent to the adoption. The 
mother unsuccessfully sought to set aside her relinquishment in her 
state's courts and in a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.s 
The state laws that govern consents by mothers of newborn infants 
apply to a variety of adoption services providers-public agencies, non-
profit, and for-profit private agencies, lawyers, physicians, and other 
"facilitators," "a new breed of adoption entrepreneurs who specialize in 
finding pregnant women for prospective parents." Public agencies, 
however, principally arrange adoptions of older children and children 
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with special needs,6 while most adoptions of domestic newborns are han-
dled by private agencies and by independent, non-agency intermediar-
ies.' Since 1970, according to historian Barbara Melosh, even private 
agency adoptions have "declined sharply, in what amounts to a massive 
de facto deregulation of child placement."s As Melosh summarizes the 
situation, "[A]fter 1970, most placements have been made as private 
agreements executed between consenting adults, with minimal involve-
ment from the state."9 With the Internet as "the main catalyst," there has 
been a "huge increase" in the number of adoptions in which generally 
white couples and birth parents identify one another. lO Reliable statis-
tics are not available on the relative number of private agency versus in-
dependent, non-agency adoptions, II but both these types of providers 
are subject to limited regulation and operate under a largely "laissez 
faire" regime.12 
The "market" in which domestic infant adoptions are arranged is 
characterized by high fees, demand for children that outstrips available 
supply, and marketing aimed both at prospective adopters and at preg-
nant women who might consider placing their infants for adoption. In 
contrast to the cost of public agency adoptions, which range from zero 
to $2,500; the cost of a domestic private agency adoption ranges from 
$4,000 to more than $30,000; and the cost of a domestic independent 
adoption ranges from $8,000 to more than $30,000, or reportedly to as 
much as $50,000. 13 Families that adopt infants tend to have higher in-
comes than those that adopt older children and children with special 
needs. 14 Tax benefits often flow disproportionately to families who 
adopt infants domestically and children from other countries, although 
the benefits have been promoted as a means of increasing the number of 
adoptions of chi ldren out of foster care. 15 Some adoption professionals 
and observers argue that all adoptions should be arranged, as they are in 
some other countries, only as a social service by public chi1d welfare 
agencies or highly regulated nonprofit agencies. 16 In the United States, 
only three states limit the placement of children with unrelated adoptive 
parents to licensed agencies,17 and even in those states parties can ar-
range what are in effect independent adoptions by identifying one 
another and then using an agency to handle the arrangements. IS 
The best practices that characterize ethical and humane infant adoption 
services for the mothers of newborn infants, practices that should be 
promoted by state adoption laws, include making skHled, unbiased 
counseling available to expectant and new mothers. 19 Skilled counseling, 
as the Child Welfare League of America (CWLA) explains, helps pro-
vide assurance that "[i]nformed decisions will be made." Counseling 
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for prospective birth parents, as explained in a comprehensive guide to 
adoption practices, can help parents to "own" their decisions,2o that is, 
can help them feel "in control through having a real choice."21 Having 
felt as if they had a real choice is a factor associated with "positive reso-
lutions" for birth mothers, as is having an opportunity to talk, to reflect, 
and "to anticipate future pain."22 
Counseling for mothers should include providing information about 
alternatives to adoption, options within adoption, and legal steps and 
consequences involved in adoption. Information should be provided 
both orally and in writing. As social worker Patricia Roles puts it in a 
guide for counselors published by the CWLA, "[o]nly with all the facts 
can anyone make a well-thought-out, informed decision. Supplying 
written information is most useful because it allows the client to read 
and digest the material when she feels ready."23 Information provided 
orally may be insufficient because the recipient may be "in a state of 
shock or denial and unable to retain all the information."24 Initially, in-
formation should be available to pregnant women and new mothers 
about what alternatives to adoption are available for the care of their 
children, how to determine the support needed if they rear their children, 
and how to access the resources they would need.25 With respect to 
adoption, they should have information about and understand available 
options, including possible degrees of openness.26 Mothers should also 
receive accurate and clear information about the legal steps involved 
and their consequencesP 
In addition, mothers should be given information about the ways that 
placing a child for adoption may affect the mothers themselves and the 
child in both the short and long term. The CWLA standards advise that 
"[i]n all instances, birth parents and other family members should re-
ceive counseling to help them understand the grief and loss" that they 
may experienee.28 While studies are limited, those that have been con-
ducted "suggest that relinquishment is a very stressful event and that 
many mothers are haunted by it for years later."29 The studies constitute 
"a growing body of recent research data which have supported the 
claims of birth parents that relinquishing a child is indeed a profound 
loss experience, and that this loss even can have long-term deleterious 
results."3o With respect to the effects of adoption on the child, as adop-
tion social worker James L. Gritter writes, "[A]dvantages [of adoption 
for the child] are accompanied by significant losses ... A pregnant 
woman considering adoption for her child needs to consider the ratio 
of losses and gains posed by the adoption choice."31 For the adopted 
person as well as for the birth and adoptive parents, adoption is now 
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thought to be "a lifelong process."32 Psychologist and researcher David 
M. Brodzinsky concludes that while "most adopted children appear to 
cope quite well with the challenges, conflicts, and demands of adoptive 
family life," a review of the limited research available suggests that 
"adopted children are at an increased risk for psychological and aca-
demic problems in comparison to their non-adopted counterparts."33 
Adopted children are thought to face some unique developmental chal-. 
lenges. Unlike children raised by their birth parents, "those adopted 
have to accomplish or be aided to accomplish a number of additional 
psychological tasks, which most of them do successfully."34 
Ultimately, of course, the counselor's job is to help the mother make 
a difficult decision that often involves "ambivalence and denial."35 For 
mothers, as Gritter observes, "Seldom is adoption selected as a true 
preference-it almost always involves a pronounced element of neces-
sity. The idea of adoption ... only emerges as a possible outcome when 
something is seriously askew."36 Statistics support the observation that 
adoption is not a "preferred" option for unmarried pregnant women. Be-
tween 1989 and 1995, the percentage of unmarried white women plac-
ing children for adoption was approximately 1.7%, and the percentage 
for African-American women was even smallerY 
Even when counseling is available, there is an inherent troubling po-
tential for imposition of biases and conflicts of interest. Social workers 
have a fundamental responsibility to facilitate their clients' self-deter-
mination, expand choice and opportunity for all people,38 and, when 
necessary, "take reasonable steps to ensure" that their employers' prac-
tices are consistent with the National Association of Social Workers 
code of ethics.39 Complicating an adoption counselor's task is the fact 
that in a crisis, the counselor has the potential to exercise "immense 
power."40 "There are times, especially when frustration runs high, when 
the decision-maker would love to have some powerful, decisive person 
come along and take the decision out of her hands."41 As Roles points 
out in her guide for counselors, if a "young woman must make her own 
decision because she has to live with it for the rest of her life," then the 
ideal counselor is "a neutral, unbiased [one] who has no vested interest 
in the outcomes of her decision."42 She continues, "If a client feels pres-
sured toward any particular choices, a power struggle will result where 
the client will be forced to defend her position, rather than consider all 
the options."43 
Counselors, agency officials, and intermediaries, of course, may have 
strong biases based on their own philosophical, religious, or social views. 
They may favor family preservation, regardless of the circumstances, or 
90 ADOPTION QUARTERLY 
they may believe adoption is invariably the best option when a mother is 
unmarried or has limited economic and social support. Another factor 
that can affect the neutrality of counseling is the conflict that arises from 
one entity's providing services to birth parents and adoptive parents 
simultaneously. It is natural for service providers to attend to the clients 
who are paying for the services-the prospective adoptive parents,44 and it 
is easier for many providers to sympathize with the adoptive parents, who 
are usually more established in life and may have struggled to conceive a 
child. The support and advocacy group Concerned United Birthparents 
advises pregnant women and new mothers not to expect that an agency or 
a pregnancy counselor "wlll have only your best interest in mind. They do 
not, and they cannot. Adoption agencies, like it or not, have to make 
money to operate. The paying client is the adoptive parent, so services are 
usually geared toward them."45 . 
With respect to bes t practices and the timi ng of mothers' consent to 
the adoption of their newborn infants, there is nearly universal agree-
ment that an expectant mother should not consent to adoption before the 
birth because she cannot be sure of what her feelings will be after the 
child is born.46 Reportedly, some one half of the women who believe 
they have settled on adoption change their minds after the birth.47 The 
Wyoming Supreme Court noted that "[ e ]xperience has evidenced a host 
of cases in which a mother plans to give her unborn child to adoptive 
parents, only to change her mind after going through child birth and the 
resulting mother-child attachment."48 The guide for counselors pub-
lished by the CWLA advises counselors to make sure birth parents un-
derstand that they are the child's legal parents. "This means that they 
can see, hold, feed, or care for their baby. The level of contact is up to 
them. Many young people feel intimidated by those in authority and 
might not realize that they have these choices."49 
Author Adam Pertman, now executive director of the Evan B. Donal-
dson Adoption Institute, reports that "[b]irth mothers typically want to 
spend time with their babies, and virtually all mental-health and so-
cial-work professionals advise them to do so. Some just hold their chil-
dren for a few minutes, while others need days or weeks."5o The birth 
parents' organization CUB contends that women who sign irrevocable 
consents in the hospital shortly after birth are "rushed into signing with-
out a chance to process all of the information."51 CUB categorically ad-
vises women, "[N]ever sign papers in the hospital ... Adoption is a 
serious matter, one that should be finalized only in a courtroom or a legal 
environment, not a recovery bed."52 Infants, of course, can be placed in 
the custody of their prospective adoptive parents as soon as the parties 
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feel confident that the birth parents are unlikely to change their minds. 
For example, a number of agencies in Scotland place newborns directly 
from the hospital even though the mother has six weeks to change her 
mind, "provided the mother's decision about the future of her baby 
seem[s] final."s3 
Laws in slightly more than half the states address the issue of counsel-
ing services for mothers considering placing their newborn infants for 
adoption, and all state laws regulate the timing of these mothers' con-
sents. With respect to counseling, 10 states require counseling for birth 
parents in some or in alI adoptions. Some of those states specify requi-
site amounts of counseling and some specify the timing of the counsel-
ing. Twenty states have statutory requirements that birth parents in 
some or all types of adoptions be made aware of the fact that counseling 
is available, with two states specifying counseling by a licensed adop-
tion agency. Only a handful of these states specify how much counsel-
ing should be offered or mandate the counselor's qualifications or 
affiliations.54 
With respect to the timing of consents, the state laws that currently 
govern mothers' consents to the adoption of their newborn infants vary 
widely but fall into a few basic types. As a general rule, consents may be 
set aside in all jurisdictions for fraud, duress, or undue influence, usu-
ally for limited periods oftime after consent has been given or after the 
adoption has been granted. In the absence of such wrongdoing, which is 
difficult to establish,ss mothers in many states are afforded a limited op-
portunity to revoke their consent. The state laws governing consent fol-
Iowa number of different patterns. Under a few states' laws, mothers 
may sign consents before the birth but then have a brief period of time 
after the birth to revoke them. Under some state laws, consents may be 
signed any time after the birth and are then revocable for a specified pe-
riod. Under other state laws, consents may not be signed until a speci-
fied number of hours or days after birth and are then revocable for a 
specified period. A different group of state laws provides that irrevoca-
ble consents may be signed at any time after birth. Other state laws pro-
vide that irrevocable consents may be signed after a specified number of 
hours or days following birth.56 In contrast to the laws in many other 
countries, including a majority of European countries and Australian 
states in which consent may not be given or does not become final for a 
period of approximately six weeks,s7 in approximately half the U.S. 
states the mother's irrevocable consent can be established iii as short a 
period as less than four days after birth; in approximat~ly 10% of the 
states, it can be established in less than seven days afl.er birth; and in 
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approximately 15% of the states, it can be established in less than two 
weeks after birth.58 
Given that the availability of counseling is an essential aspect of best 
practices, there is at least potential utility in requirements that a number of 
counseling sessions be available, that the sessions be with a licensed so-
cial worker or therapist, and that the sessions be available both well in ad-
vance of giving consent and after consent has been given. But, as 
suggested earlier, first, it is very difficult to ensure that counseling will be 
skilled and unbiased and, second, there are risks of conflicts of interest 
when the counseling is offered or arranged by the agency or individual 
handling the adoption, as well as when it is offered by other providers but 
nevertheless paid for by the prospective adoptive parents. California at-
tempts to minimize, but does not eliminate, this risk by requiring that pro-
spective birth parents in independent adoptions be advised of their rights 
and offered three separate counseling sessions by an "adoption service 
provider," defined as a licensed agency or a licensed clinical social 
worker with five years of relevant experience. The counselor who advises 
the birth parents must not have any "contractual relationship with the 
adoptive parents, an attorney for the adoptive parents, or any other indi-
vidual or ... organization perfonning any type of services for the adop-
tive parents and for which the adoptive parents are paying a fee, except as 
relates" to the fee for the counseling.59 When a state attempts to regulate 
counselors' qualifications, services, and affiliations in this way, or itself 
provides counseling services, the state imposes or incurs substantial 
costs, a fact that helps explain why other states have not adopted such 
measures and why they are unlikely to do so. Similarly, increased costs 
and potential delays make it unlikely many states will consider joining 
the 10 states that require another means of ensuring decisions are made 
freely and voluntarily. These states require that the mothers in some or all 
independent adoptions appear in court to relinquish parental rights or give 
their consent, a procedure recommended as a key, if imperfect, safeguard 
by adoption law scholar Joan Heifetz Hollinger,60 and a procedure the ef-
ficacy of which suggested by a relative paucity of reported disputes in 
which the procedure was employed. 
With respect to the laws governing the timing of consents as well as 
the provision of counseling, it is possible to create powerful incentives 
for adoption service providers to follow best practices. As state laws 
provide in the very different context of consumer contracts, laws can 
provide effective information requirements and consent timing rules. At 
very low cost, states can, and some states do, require that specific 
information be provided at specified times, orally and in ~pecific written 
• 
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formats, and that provision and receipt of the information be confirmed 
in writing. For example, Vermont has enacted the Uniform Adoption 
Act (1994) which requires, among other things, that (1) a parent "shall 
have been informed of the meaning and consequences of adoption" and 
"the availability of personal and legal counseling"; (2) the person before 
whom the consent or relinquishment is executed must certify both that 
he or she orally explained the contents and consequences of executing 
the document and that the person signing the consent read or was read 
the document and was offered a copy; and (3) the consent contain "spe-
cific instructions as to how to revoke the consent or relinquishment."61 
Even more effective than information requirements, and equally 
practicable, are rules that prohibit giving hasty irrevocable consents. 
Such rules require no or only modest expenditures. In the period after 
birth and before consent is final, an infant may be cared for by the 
mother, the father, or both parents, either independently or with assis-
tance, or by foster parents. While foster care before placement is 
disfavored compared with care by the baby's mother,62 no research or 
historical experience suggests that a period of a few days to a few weeks 
in foster care adversely affects newborn babies who, then, return to their 
birth families or move into secure adoptive placements, In domestic 
adoptions in the past, many children were kept in care for six to nine 
months before placement in an effort to insure their physical and mental 
fitness. 63 In any event, such speedy consents are not necessary for early 
placements into adoptive homes. As discussed earlier, if a child's par-
ents and the prospective adoptive parents are confident that the parents' 
decisions are final, and if they aU wish for an early placement, the 
child's parents can place the child in the adoptive home before consent 
has been given or becomes final.64 Speedy consents are also unneces-
sary to ensure suitable adoptive placements for children, given the great 
demand for healthy newborns. 
Prohibiting hasty consents creates incentives for service providers to 
follow best practices in adoption. When a mother who has tentatively 
agreed to adoption subsequently decides not to place her child, service 
providers and prospective adoptive parents face potentially great costs, 
financial and emotional. The chance the mother will change her mind is 
greatest if she has been inadequately counseled or improperly pressured 
but then is afforded adequate time to consider and to reconsider her deci-
sion. Therefore, if hasty consents are not permitted, all adoption services 
providers and prospective adoptive parents have a powerful incentive to 
follow best practices from the outset. In other words, prohibiting hasty 
consents promotes best practices among those wbo might be tempted to 
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disregard them-whether for philosophical, religious, emotional, or finan-
eial reasons-in order to meet the compelling desires of prospective adop-
tive parents. 
The most advantageous laws provide both a period of time after birth 
before which consent may be given and a subsequent period of time for 
revocation. Mothers who feel they have sufficiently deliberated and 
firmly decided on adoption may give their legal consent not long after 
birth and then choose to neither entertain nor exercise their right to re-
voke. They may "walk away," knowing that the adoption will be com-
pleted without further participation on their part. For mothers in less 
favorable circumstances, the revocation period offers an opportunity for 
reflection as they recover from giving birth and begin to experience the 
effects that the decision will have on themselves and their families. To 
determine the optimal periods of time, there is no magic formula that 
perfectly balances the need for deliberate decisions with the need to es-
tablish children in their permanent homes. If the period before a mother 
may consent is three to seven days, most mothers will be out of the hos-
pital, free of the strongest effects of medication, and probably more sen-
sible of their right not to place their children despite any tentative 
arrangements made before birth. If the subsequent, unqualified revoca-
tion period is approximately three weeks, the total period of approxi-
mately four weeks will still be shorter than in many other countries and 
shorter than the postpartum period of six to eight weeks between birth 
and the time when the mother's body has returned as closely as possible 
to its pre-pregnant state.65 It may, nevertheless, be long enough for most 
mothers to recover from the etIeets of childbirth and long enough 
for counteraeting to some extent any lack of adequate information or 
supportive counseling. 
Infant adoptions are momentous, life-altering events, not only for the 
child and both sets of parents, but also for the extended families. We can-
not predict how a child's personality, interests, and talents will mesh with 
those of either the child's birth or adoptive parents and siblings, or how a 
child will respond to having been placed for adoption. We cannot know 
what opportunities a family will enjoy and what challenges it will face. 
When a state places its legal imprimatur on the unmaking of one family 
and the making of another, the state should at least insure to the greatest 
extent possible that aU the individuals involved have followed or have 
been afforded the best practices that ethics and humanity demand. For 
mothers considering placing their children for adoption, skilled, unbiased 
counseling is invaluable; complete, well-communicated information is 
indispensable; and time is, perhaps, "the wisest counselor of al1."66 
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